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Abstract
The paper investigates a climate-economy model with an iso-elastic
welfare function in which one parameter γ measures relative risk-aversion
and a distinct parameter ρ measures resistance to intertemporal substi-
tution. We show both theoretically and numerically that climate policy
responds differently to variations in the two parameters. In particular,
we show that higher γ but lower ρ leads to increase emissions control.
We also argue that climate-economy models based on intertemporal ex-
pected utility maximization, i.e. models where γ = ρ, may misinterpret
the sensitivity of the climate policy to risk-aversion.
Keywords: risk-aversion, equity, discounting, climate change
JEL classification: Q20, D81, D90, H43
1 Introduction
In this paper, we explore the issues of risk and intergenerational equity within
a climate-economy model. Our approach differs from the recent approach that
has examined what adjustments to the discount factor are necessary to account
for a future environmental risk (see, e.g., [14], [4]). Instead, we examine how
social preferences specification with respect to risk and equity affects the op-
timal climate policy. More precisely, we use a broad class of preferences that
is particularly appropriate to examine risk-aversion and intertemporal substitu-
tion effects: recursive preferences. These preferences were introduced by [9]. To
date, recursive preferences have been used mostly in finance and precautionary
savings literature ([13], [3]).
Most previously published models of climate risk policy use the intertem-
poral expected utility (EU) framework. It is well-known that this framework
imposes a specific restriction. With EU preferences, resistance to intertemporal
substitution is constrained to be equal to relative risk-aversion. Let us recall
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that resistance to substitution controls the attitude toward variations in con-
sumption across time, under certainty. On the other hand, risk-aversion controls
the attitude toward variations in consumption across states of the world, at a
given date. Hence the restriction is suspicious since it links conceptually two
different aspects of preferences, risk-aversion and intergenerational equity. Fur-
thermore, from a theoretical viewpoint this restriction prevents consideration
of plausible situations where society would display high risk-aversion together
with low resistance to substitution, or vice versa. Another consequence is that
the effect of resistance to substitution and risk-aversion cannot be conveniently
investigated within the EU framework: changing the curvature of the utility
function makes both resistance to substitution and risk aversion move together
and this does not permit an unambiguous interpretation.
In this paper, we use recursive preferences with iso-elastic functional forms
in which one parameter γ measures risk-aversion and a distinct parameter ρ
measures resistance to intertemporal substitution. Our first objective will be to
clarify the respective role of γ and ρ within a two-period stock pollutant model.
We will show that, in general, an increase in risk-aversion γ leads to an increase
in emissions control while an increase in resistance to substitution ρ leads to a
decrease in emissions control. We will next examine numerically the separate
effects of these two parameters in a multi-period integrated model relevant for
the analysis of a policy response to the risk of global warming. Our numerical
simulations support the theoretical predictions about the opposite effects of γ
and ρ on optimal emissions control. A side result is that there is more variation
when the parameters vary separately rather than jointly (γ = ρ), as in the
expected utility framework.
2 Risk-aversion and substitution effects in a two-
period stock pollutant model
Consider a simple two-period model. Consumption ct is the only source of
utility in each period, t = 1, 2. Consumption is the sum of two positive terms,
ct = yt + et, where yt is exogenous wealth, and et is the endogenous control
variable which represents the level of emissions of CO2 emitted in period t. The
initial stock of pollutant m0 is given, and afterward it accumulates following
mt = rmt−1 + et where r > 0 denotes the fraction of emissions that remains
from one period to the next. Pollution damages occur in period 2 proportionally
to the stockm2 and to a stochastic parameter 1−x˜. Expressed in terms of stocks,
consumption stream is thus:
(c1, c˜2) = (y1 +m1 − rm0, y2 − rm1 + x˜m2) (1)
In the recursive framework, preferences over (c1, c˜2) may be described as fol-
lows. Stochastic future consumption c˜2 is converted into its certainty equivalent
µ(c˜2) given by:
2
µ(c˜2) = v−1(Ev(c˜2))
= (Ec˜1−γ2 )
1
1−γ (2)
where E denotes the expectation operator. We thus use a specific iso-elastic
utility function where γ > 0 is the Arrow-Pratt relative risk-aversion parameter.
To maximize social welfare in period 1, denoted U1, this certainty equivalent
is discounted and combined with current consumption c1 using an iso-elastic
aggregator function f :
U1 = f(c1, µ(c˜2))
= (c1−ρ1 + β µ(c˜2)
1−ρ)
1
1−ρ (3)
These preferences clearly separate risk aversion —tied to the certainty equiv-
alent function µ or v— from intertemporal substitution —tied to aggregator
function f . Parameter β is the pure time preference discounting factor. Pa-
rameter ρ > 0 in the aggregator function is the resistance to intertemporal
substitution parameter. When ρ = γ we retrieve the standard intertemporal
expected utility framework and the social planner simply maximizes (c1−γ1 +
β E(c˜21−γ))
1
1−γ .
The objective is to find the optimal resource use policy (m1,m2) which
maximizes U1, bringing (2), (3) and (1) together. Annex 1 shows that the
optimal consumption level in the first period is:
c∗1(γ, ρ) =
y2/r + y1 − rm0
1 + β1/ρ(µ[γ]r)1/ρ−1
(4)
where µ[γ] is a positive parameter defined eq. 12 that will be interpreted
later using eq. 5.
Having solved analytically the model, one can easily notice that consumption
in period 1 is increasing in yt, t = 1, 2, and decreasing in the decay factor r, in
the initial pollution level m0 and in the discount factor β.
This closed-form solution allows us to show theoretically how the optimal
consumption depends in a different manner on ρ and γ. The total differential
of c∗1 with respect to (γ, ρ) is:
dc∗1 =
∂c∗1
∂γ
dγ︸ ︷︷ ︸ +
∂c∗1
∂ρ
dρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
Risk-aversion effect Resistance to substitution effect
Comparative statics in the EU framework amounts to examining the previ-
ous differential only along the ρ = γ direction. In this way risk-aversion and
substitution effects are mixed together within the EU framework. Recursive
utility allows us to show in the Annex 1 that:
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• ∂c∗1(γ,ρ)∂γ < 0 if and only if ρ > 1.
• ∂c∗1(γ,ρ)∂ρ > 0 if and only if βrµ[γ] > 1.
Let us comment briefly on these two results. First, since ρ > 1 is in general
considered as more plausible than the opposite (see more on this point later),
we get that the risk-aversion effect is negative in general. This makes sense.
More risk-aversion decreases current consumption and thus decreases current
emissions today. This leads to reduced future exposure to a risk of climate
change.
Second, direct computations show that
µ(c˜∗2)− c∗1
c∗1
= (βrµ[γ])1/ρ − 1 (5)
Hence we get that βrµ[γ] > 1 if and only if µ(c˜∗2) > c
∗
1. As a result, the
resistance of substitution effect is positive if and only if there is positive expected
growth. This last assumption is generally accepted without much discussion.
The intuition behind this effect is that higher resistance to substitution raises the
desire to smooth consumption over time, that is to take from the richer future
generation and give to the poorer current generation. Since increasing emissions
raises current consumption and thus reduces future consumption, increasing ρ
generally implies higher optimal first period emissions.
In short, this study shows that risk-aversion and substitution effects in gen-
eral go in the opposite direction. Analyzing only the joint effect dc∗1(γ, γ)/dγ as
in EU models theoretically underestimates the effect of risk-aversion.
3 Climate-economy with recursive preferences
In the previous section, with the help of a simple stock pollution model, we
have analyzed the sensitivity of the optimal first-period pollution level to the
resistance to intertemporal substitution ρ and to relative risk aversion γ param-
eters. We turn now to the empirical analysis on this question within a climate
economy. The objective is two-fold. First, to examine whether the intuitions
derived in the simple theoretical model carry over to a multi-period framework
more representative for climate policy analysis. Second, to investigate how large
are the effects generated by preferences specification with respect to risk and
intergenerational equity.
The model considered below can be viewed as an extension to the DIAM
model first described in [5]. The model is presented in Annex 2. It is discussed
extensively in [6].
The model combines a stylized carbon-cycle with a neoclassical growth model.
It is calibrated according to recent IPCC scenarios [8]. These scenarios describe
future economic conditions in 2020, 2050 and 2080. As a result, we will con-
sider four period in our model. Each period lasts for 30 years and represents a
generation (e.g. generation 1 is 1990–2019).
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Production is a Cobb-Douglas function of Capital, Labor and Energy inputs.
Investment is a fixed fraction of production and accumulates with a fixed de-
preciation rate. Labor is exogenous. Exogenous technical progress and climate
change impacts directly affect the overall level of productivity in the production
function. The level of Energy input depends upon its price ptXt, where pt is a
given baseline andXt the endogenous energy tax multiplier. WhenXt increases,
the energy used decreases. Production, consumption, and welfare decrease too,
but proportionally much more slowly than energy. Less energy used translates
into less CO2 emissions, hence a lower atmospheric CO2 concentration, which
means ultimately less climate change impact.
This process thus represents the first order effect of carbon tax (no distor-
tions) as it is most often represented in the integrated assessment literature.
Let us make one specific comment though about equation (19). This equation
stems implicitly from the assumption that the energy sector maximizes its profit
blindly, in a sequence of static equilibria. The energy sector optimizes within a
30 years horizon, only the social planner has an intergenerational point of view.
Given the price of output is 1 and the price of energy is ptXt, this assumption
implies a well known Cobb-Douglas property
Yt/(ptXtEt) = e
The share of energy e disappears from equation (19) because the equation at
date t is scaled with the equation at date 1. Note that equation (17) is also
scaled this way.
Let us now turn to the calibration of our model. There is probably no thing
such as a realistic representation of climate change impact, but the version of
the model used in this paper proceeds along the following lines. We assume
that there are two states of the world, low damage (L) with a 25% probability
or high damage (H) with 75% probability. For notational simplicity, we omit
in the following paragraphs the index i = H or L that applies to all variables
as the Annex 2 listing explicitly shows. The damage Ft is expressed in terms
of reduction in productivity for a doubling CO2 concentration (550 ppm). This
damage is 30% productivity loss if we are in state H and only 8% in state L.
The baseline for results presented below is IPCC scenario SRES A2. It
describes a 2080 world with 12.4 billions inhabitants (up from 5.3 in 1990), with
a per capita GNP of 8.9 k$/year (up from 4.0 k$) and an GNP energy intensity
of 7.4 MJ/$ (down from 12.8 MJ/$). In this scenario, CO2 emissions in 2080
are well above 20 GtC. Importantly, this scenario is a non-mitigation scenario.
The calibration has thus been made as follows. Ex ante levels of production Y1
and E1 are given parameters. The initial level of capital is set at three times Y1.
Control Xt and damage Ft were first set to unity, i.e. ignored. This allowed us
to compute values for baseline energy costs pt and technical progress coefficients
at by using scenario A2 values for Yt and Et.
All in all, the calibration of our climate economy based on a non-mitigation
scenario resembles the usual methodology developed by Nordhaus for DICE [10].
Since the originality is that we introduce recursive preferences within a climate
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economy, let us now explain in more detail how we have calibrated recursive
preferences.
The previous two-period model generalizes directly to a N -periods model
as Ut = f(ct, µt) and µt = v−1(Etv(U˜t+1)), where U˜t+1 is next generation
uncertain utility. In such a framework, each generation cares only about its
own consumption and the certainty equivalent of the next generation’s utility.
Maximizing the welfare of the first generation U1 insures by recursivity that the
interests of all future generations are accounted for.
The choice of the relative units of consumption and utility matters in nu-
merical models. This is dealt with by introducing a new coefficient α which was
not apparent in the two period model (the coefficient was unity). This gives the
following recursive preferences:
U1−ρt = α c
1−ρ
t + β (EtU˜
1−γ
t+1 )
1−ρ
1−γ (6)
In the literature, this coefficient is set to α = 1−β. In order to understand this
choice of α, let g˜ be the expected growth of utility beyond the last period, that
is U˜N+1 = (1 + g˜)UN . Then equation (6) in that period is equivalent to:
α(cN/UN )
1−ρ = 1− β[Et(1 + g˜)1−γ ]
1−ρ
1−γ (7)
It appears that the equality α = 1 − β arises from two stationarity conditions:
U4 = c4 and g˜ = 0. The first condition sets U and c in the same units, that is
the same numerical scale. The second stationarity condition potentially leads
to mathematical problems with a zero utility discount rate, as β = 1 implies
α = 0. However, divergence under assumptions of zero stationary growth and
zero utility discount rate should not come as a surprise here, since recursive
preferences generalizes classical discounted intertemporal utility.
Another important question is the inclusion of population lt into the so-
cial welfare criteria. In doing so, our objective was to retrieve the standard
intertemporal expected utility model in the special case ρ = γ. Thus Ut and µt
are defined per capita, and the recursive equations of the model become:
U1−ρt = (1− β)(lt/lN )ρc1−ρt + βµ1−ρt (8)
(ltµt)1−γ = Et(lt+1U˜t+1)1−γ (9)
The energy tax is then chosen to optimize the first’s generation welfare.
The risk of climate impact affects the economy from period 1, the state of the
nature H or L is determined at the start. However, the social planner adjusts
the optimal policy only in period 4. The reason for this lag is to account
for political inertia plus the period of scientific doubt before the true level of
climate impact becomes “sufficiently observable”. A thorough examination of
the effects of uncertainty resolution and adjustment costs is developed in [6].
Also the model assumes that the endogenous control variable Xt is non negative.
Importantly, in the final period, X4 is chosen so as to stabilize the atmospheric
CO2 concentration in period 4 for ever.
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Finally, there is the issue of the calibration of the parameters γ and ρ.
Research on savings and portfolio behavior analysis derived many empirical es-
timates. Hall [7] estimated the response of saving to the real interest rate, that
is the elasticity of intertemporal substitution (1/ρ). All estimates presented by
Hall report small elasticity of substitution that may well be zero. [12] argued
that Hall’s model was mis-specified and found estimates of resistance to sub-
stitution ρ that vary between 2.2 and 3.1. Epstein and Zin’s seminal paper [3]
found estimates for ρ that vary between 1.2 and 5 and estimates for γ that
vary between 0.8 and 1.3. Using a similar approach, [11] estimates for ρ and γ
are in the range of 1.5. It is also noticeable that [11] accepted the hypothesis
ρ = γ while Epstein-Zin rejected the EU model. In an experimental frame-
work, [2] reported estimates of each parameter based on individual responses to
hypothetical situations. They found high heterogeneity among individuals. A
striking result of their study is that risk aversion and resistance to substitution
are not correlated at all across individuals.
To sum up, there is no decisive empirical evidence either to reject or to accept
intertemporal EU models (ρ = γ) nor to choose some specific values for ρ and
γ. [1] reports that 1.5 is the currently available best-guess for both parameters.
Values between 0.5 and 4, with emphasis upon 1.5 and 2.0 will be used in the
next section. Baseline parameters values are given in Annex 2.
4 Risk-aversion and substitution effects in the
climate economy
This section examines the sensitivity of the optimal carbon tax to the risk-
aversion and the resistance to intertemporal substitution parameters.
Figure 1 displays the relative effect γ and ρ on pollution control at dates
2020, 2050 and 2080. The horizontal axis represents variations in parameters γ
and ρ from 0.5 to 4. Values corresponding to logarithmic preferences, i.e. γ → 1
and/or ρ→ 1 are interpolated, we only computed the value at 1.1 and assumed
continuity. The vertical scale represents the optimal energy price multiplier Xt
computed by the model described in the previous section. Hence, the optimal
carbon tax is thus simply given by Xt − 1.
Note also that 2080’s optimal tax corresponds to two curves. This is because
we allowed period 4 policy to be contingent to H or L. More precisely, the
upper (respectively lower) branch represents last period’s optimal tax in state
H (respectively L). The intuition here is simply that the higher is the climate
impact, the higher is the optimal tax rate.
Observe first that the optimal tax is increasing over time. Indeed, no control
is optimal is 1990 (not displayed), then optimal control becomes a few percent
or zero in 2020 while it increases up to a tax range located between 70% and
100% in 2050. Finally, the optimal tax may go up to 250% in 2080 in state H
and for high values of risk-aversion.
Let us examine the effect of risk-aversion alone, that is Figure 1’s left panel.
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Figure 1: Optimal energy price multiplier X at period 2, 3 and 4 for varying
preference functions parameters. The left panel varies risk aversion γ keeping
ρ = 1.5 while the right panel varies ρ keeping γ = 2.0
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γ (risk aversion) 1.5 2.0 1.5 2.0
ρ (resistance to subst.) 2.0 2.0 1.5 1.5
Discount 1% 3.1 4.8 10.3 12.0
Discount 1.5% 0.0 0.0 4.5 6.2
Table 1: Joint sensitivity of (X2 − 1), i.e. the optimal tax in period 2, to the
preferences parameters γ, ρ and the discount rate.
Results show consistently that higher risk-aversion leads to an increase in the
carbon tax. This illustrates our previous theoretical result where increased risk-
aversion leads to increase control provided that ρ is larger than one. This is the
case here since our baseline scenario uses ρ = 1.5. Interestingly note that the
effect of the risk-aversion is nearly linear. The effect of an absolute change in
γ thus does not depend on the initial value of risk-aversion. For instance, in
2050, for a 1 point variation in risk-aversion, e.g. a change of γ from 1 to 2, the
optimal carbon tax would be increased by approximately 15%.
Turning to the effect of resistance to substitution, the right panel shows that
increasing ρ generally leads to a decrease in optimal pollution control. There is
an apparent exception in 2050 where optimal pollution control increases for low
value of ρ. But this is more than compensated by a decrease in 2020 tax level,
so it remains true that overall higher values for ρ lead to a decreased optimal
tax. Indeed the transfer of the tax load from 2020 to 2050 as ρ increases is a
logical result since the 2050 generation is richer, so higher ρ means placing the
burden on it instead of the 2020 period.
This shows that there are two effects to increasing ρ: one is to decrease the
overall level of pollution control, the other is to transfer the burden to the future.
The order of magnitude of the effect of an absolute change in ρ is globally the
same as for a change in γ. For instance, in 2020, an increase in ρ from 1 to 2
leads to a decrease in tax by about 15%.
Sensitivity of results to joint variations in ρ and γ are reported in Table
1. Annual discount rates of 1 and 1.5 per cent are examined. Table 1 confirms
that, all other things being equal, increasing risk aversion leads to higher control.
Similarly, increasing resistance to intertemporal substitution or increasing the
discount rate leads to lower control. Note though that a 1.5% discount rate
together with a resistance to substitution parameter ρ = 2 makes the positive
tax constraint binding. As a result the optimal tax hits zero in that case and is
not sensitive to risk aversion.
This table also illustrates the effect of risk-aversion within an EU framework,
i.e. under the constraint γ = ρ. First observe that, with a 1% discount rate,
increasing risk aversion alone from 1.5 to 2 leads to a slightly increased carbon
tax from 10.3% to 12.0%. Yet, under the constraint γ = ρ, increasing risk
aversion from γ = 1.5 (= ρ) to γ = 2.0 (= ρ) would lead to a decrease, and not
an increase, in the carbon tax from 10.3% to 4.8%.
As a result, the EU model predicts a negative impact of risk-aversion on
pollution control. This is paradoxical, but the explanation is obviously that it
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moves the two parameters simultaneously and the negative effect of ρ more than
offsets the positive effect of risk-aversion γ. Hence, the EU model may lead to
understand wrongly the effect of the so-called risk-aversion parameter on the
climate policy. More generally, since the effect of one parameter is counterbal-
anced by the effect of the other parameter, the EU model may misinterpret lack
of sensitivity of the parameters γ and ρ. Here the sensitivity of optimal tax
to a cross variation in the parameters is only 40 to 60 percent larger than the
sensitivity to a joint variation.
To summarize, these numerical results do correspond to the theoretical re-
sults. First, increasing risk aversion γ has a positive effect on the control rate.
Second, increasing resistance to intertemporal substitution ρ decreases the con-
trol rate. Third, and consequently, the classical EU model which accounts for
the simultaneous variation of these two parameters, may lead to an misunder-
estimate of the effect of one parameter alone. This may explain, in turn, why
previous climate change models, such as DICE, found little sensitivity of climate
policy to risk-aversion.
5 Conclusion
In this paper, we explained how to use the generalized Kreps-Porteus recur-
sive preferences in an integrated assessment model of global climate change.
This kind of social objective function cuts the link between risk aversion γ and
resistance to intertemporal substitution ρ. This is in contrast with most pre-
viously published climate policy models, that maximize the discounted sum of
logarithmic expected utility, corresponding to the ρ = γ = 1 case.
Theoretical and empirical results about the sensitivity of the optimal energy
consumption path show that these two parameters have opposite effects. Larger
risk aversion increases optimal pollution control: provided that ρ is not too low,
more risk aversion γ leads to less emissions in the short term. Larger resistance
to substitution ρ induces less pollution control. This is an income effect stating
that assuming expected economic growth, higher ρ leads to more emissions in
the short term. This is equivalent to increasing the discount rate, which also
implies a higher level of optimal pollution in the near-term.
Consequently, constraining ρ = γ leads to underestimating the sensitivity of
optimal results to the shape of the social welfare function. Recursive preferences
thus contribute to the discussion on discounting in large risks cost-benefit anal-
ysis. It provides an analytical framework for precautionary-principle motivated
preferences: low resistance to substitution with high risk aversion leads to the
largest carbon tax levels.
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Annex 1 Theoretical resolution
The objective is to find
max
m1,m2
U1 =
(
(y1 +m1 − rm0)1−ρ + β(E(y2 − rm1 +m2x˜)1−γ)
1−ρ
1−γ
) 1
1−ρ (10)
The dynamic optimization program (10) is solved in two steps backward.
The first step is to find m∗2 maximizing (E(y2 − rm1 +m2x˜)1−γ)
1
1−γ . The first-
order condition for m∗2 gives:
m∗2 = (y2 − rm1) k, with k defined by Ex˜(1 + k x˜)−γ = 0 (11)
This implies that the certainty equivalent of future consumption is:
µ(c˜∗2) = (y2 − rm1)µ[γ], with µ[γ] = (E(1 + k x˜)1−γ)1/(1−γ) (12)
Note that µ[γ] is positive and does not depends on m1. This can be seen as the
certainty equivalent of future risk by unit of consumption
The second step is to solve the period 1 problem, that is maximize U1 given
(12). The first order condition for m∗1 gives:
(y1 +m∗1 − rm0)−ρ − βr(µ[γ])1−ρ(y2 − rm∗1)−ρ = 0 (13)
that is
m∗1 =
rm0 − y1 + y2µ[γ](βrµ[γ])−1/ρ
1 + rµ[γ](βrµ[γ])−1/ρ
(14)
One can easily check that second order conditions are satisfied, so that m∗1 is
the level of first-period stock that maximizes social welfare. Therefore, using
c∗1 = y1 +m
∗
1 − rm0, it is direct to see that the optimal consumption level in
first period is the one given in (4).
From (4), it is then straightforward to obtain:
∂ log(c∗1)
∂γ
=
ρ− 1
µ[γ]ρ(1 + β−1/ρ(µ[γ]r)1−1/ρ)
× µ′[γ] (15)
∂ log(c∗1)
∂ρ
=
log(βrµ[γ])
ρ2(1 + β−1/ρ(µ[γ]r)1−1/ρ)
(16)
Focus first on the effect of relative risk aversion. Using the envelope theorem,
it is easy to find that the certainty equivalent µ[γ] decreases with risk-aversion
γ, that is µ′[γ] < 0. With equation (15), this implies that higher risk aversion in-
creases emissions in period if and only if resistance to substitution is sufficiently
small, ρ < 1.
Turn now to the effect of resistance to substitution. Equation (16) shows
that ∂ log(c∗1)/∂ρ has the sign of log(βrµ[γ]). Therefore, first-period emissions
increase with resistance to substitution if and only if βrµ[γ] > 1.
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Annex 2 DIAM-ULTRAL model
This model can be used freely and the source downloaded at the author’s home-
page.
Variables
Xi,t Energy cost multiplier (Control variable)
Yi,t Production (GNP per capita per year in kUS$ 90)
Ki,t Capital stock (kUS$ 90 per capita)
Ei,t Energy input (toe per capita per year)
Ci,t Consumption (kUS$ 90 per capita per year)
Mi,t Begin-of-period cuMulative global emissions (GtC)
Ni,t Begin-of-period CO2 mixing ratio (ppmv)
Fi,t Climate damage (fraction of Yi,t)
Ui,t Utility (k dol. 90 per capita)
Vi,t Certainty equiValent of next generation’s utility (kUS$ 90 p.c.)
Equations
DIAM-ULTRAL maximizes UH,1 under constraints 17-25, the stochastic dy-
namic programming constraint XL,t = XH,t for all t ≤ 3 and the final station-
arity condition Ni,4 = Ni,3.
Yi,t/Y
1 = atFi,t(Ki,t/K1)
k(Ei,t/E1)
e
(17)
Ci,t = (1− st)Yi,t (18)
Yi,t/Y
1 = ptXi,tEi,t/E1 (19)
Ki,t+1lt+1 = (µKi,t + νstYi,t)lt (20)
Mi,t+1 = Mi,t + δχtEi,tlt (21)
Ni,t = α0t + α
1
tMi,t (22)
Fi,t = 1−∆iNi,t − 275275 (23)
U1−ρi,t = (1− β)(lt/l4)ρC1−ρi,t + βV 1−ρi,t (24)
Vi,tlt =
{ Ui,t+1lt+1 t = 1, 2[
pi(lt+1UH,t+1)
1−γ + (1− pi)(lt+1UL,t+1)1−γ
] 1
1−γ
t = 3
Ci,4l4(µKi,4 + νs4Yi,4)/Ki,4 t = 4
(25)
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Baseline parameters (Corresponds to IPCC A2 scenario)
k Elasticity of capital 0.36
e Elasticity of energy 0.04
lt World population 5.26, 8.19, 11.30, 12.35 billions
at Technical progress coefficient 1.00, 1.22, 1.55, 1.62
st Saving ratio 0.30, 0.30, 0.25, 0.25
pt Baseline increase in the energy input cost 1.00, 1.07, 1.33, 1.79
Y 1 Production per capita in 1990 without damages 3.82 k$90
E1 Energy per capita in 1990 without reduction 1.21 toe
K1 Initial capital 11.46 k$90
µ Inter-period depreciation of capital 0.215
ν Inter-period accumulation of investment 16.14
β Inter-period utility discount factor 0.74
ρ Resistance to intertemporal substitution 1.5
γ Relative risk-aversion 2.0
δ Duration of a period 30 years
χt Carbon content of energy 0.97, 0.91, 0.84, 1.17 tC/toe
α0t Intercept of the carbon-cycle relation 354, 371, 390, 297 ppmv
α1t Slope of the carbon-cycle relation 0.154, 0.129, 0.278,0.168 ppmv/toe
pi Probability for a negative impact 0.25
∆ Climate change productivity loss at 550 ppmv 0.08 if L, 0.30 if H
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